Abstract. Mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange are fundamental techniques for enabling secure communication over public, insecure networks. It is well known how to design secure protocols for achieving these goals when parties share high-entropy cryptographic keys in advance of the authentication stage. Unfortunately, it is much more common for users to share weak, low-entropy passwords which furthermore may be chosen from a known space of possibilities (say, a dictionary of English words). In this case, the problem becomes much more difficult as one must ensure that protocols are immune to off-line dictionary attacks in which an adversary exhaustively enumerates all possible passwords in an attempt to determine the correct one.
Introduction
Protocols for mutual authentication of two parties and generation of a cryptographically-strong shared key between them (authenticated key exchange) are fundamental for achieving secure communication over public, insecure networks. Protocols for mutual authentication are necessary because one needs to know "with whom one is communicating", while key-exchange protocols are required because private-key encryption schemes and message authentication codes rely on shared cryptographic keys that must be refreshed periodically. Higher-level protocols are frequently developed and analyzed assuming the existence of "secure channels" between all parties, yet this assumption cannot be realized without a secure mechanism for implementing such channels using previously-shared information.
The importance of secure key exchange was recognized as early as the seminal work of Diffie and Hellman [1976] , which shows how two parties can share a cryptographically-strong key that remains hidden from any passive eavesdropper. The Diffie-Hellman protocol, however, does not provide any form of authentication (i.e., a guarantee that the intended partners are sharing the key with each other), and in particular it does not protect against an active adversary who may inject messages, impersonate one (or both) of the parties, or otherwise control the communication in the network. Achieving any form of authentication inherently requires some information to be shared between the communicating parties in advance of the authentication stage. Historically, authentication protocols were designed under the assumption that the shared information takes the form of high-entropy cryptographic keys: either a secret key that can be used for symmetric-key encryption or message authentication, or public keys (exchanged by the parties, while the corresponding private keys are kept secret) which can be used for public-key encryption or digital signatures. Extensive attention has been given to the problem of designing two-party authentication and authenticated key-exchange protocols under such assumptions, and a number of provably-secure protocols relying on shared cryptographic keys are known [Bird et al. 1993; Diffie et al. 1992; Bellare and Rogaway 1994; Bellare et al. 1998; Shoup 1999; Krawczyk 2001, 2002] .
Protocols that assume cryptographically strong pre-shared information simply do not apply-or are trivially seen to be insecure-when the parties share a "short", low-entropy password instead. As one trivial example to indicate the difficulties that arise, consider the simple (unidirectional) authentication protocol in which one party sends a random nonce r and the other party replies with y = H ( pw, r ), where pw represents the shared password and H is a cryptographic hash function. While this protocol can be proven secure (if H is modeled as a random oracle) when pw has high entropy, it is completely insecure when the entropy of pw is small. Indeed, in the latter case a passive adversary who obtains a single transcript (r, y) can recover the password by mounting an off-line dictionary attack, trying all values of pw until one satisfying y = H ( pw , r ) is found. Other naïve attempts at "bootstrapping" a cryptographic key from a weak password can also be shown to be insecure; as an example, using pw as a "seed" to generate a public key VK for a secure signature scheme also enables an off-line dictionary attack if VK is sent in the clear, or even if a signature is sent in the clear (as an adversary can enumerate all potential public keys and attempt to verify the signature with respect to each of them). Note that "scrambling" pw by, say, hashing it will also be of no help, as the entropy of the hashed output cannot be greater than the entropy of its input.
The above represents a serious problem in practice, as it is well known that most users choose passwords poorly [Morris and Thompson 1979; Klein 1990; Spafford 1992; Wu 1999] . Unfortunately, it has proven difficult to design passwordbased protocols offering rigorous security guarantees, and there is a long history of protocols for this setting being proposed and subsequently broken (cf. the attacks shown in Bellovin and Merritt [1992] , Patel [1997] , and MacKenzie et al. [2000] ). Theoretical progress toward developing provably-secure solutions for the passwordbased setting has been slow, with the first formal models and proofs of security appearing only recently (see below). The problem is difficult in part because, as we have mentioned above, it requires "bootstrapping" from a weak shared secret to a strong one; furthermore, due to the strong adversarial model considered (cf. Sections 2.1 and 2.2), it is not even a priori clear that a solution is possible.
Initial consideration of password-based authentication assumed a "hybrid" model in which the client stores the server's public key in addition to sharing a password with the server. In this setting, Lomas et al. [1989] and Gong et al. [1993] were the first to present authentication protocols with heuristic resistance to off-line dictionary attacks. Formal definitions and rigorous proofs of security in this setting were first given by Halevi and Krawczyk [1999] ; see also Boyarsky [1999] .
The above-described "hybrid" setting suffers from the disadvantage that the client must store the server's public key (and if the client will need to authenticate to multiple servers, the client must store multiple public keys). In some sense, this obviates the reason for considering password-based protocols in the first place: namely, that human users cannot remember or securely store long, high-entropy keys. This drawback has motivated research on password-only protocols in which the client needs to remember only a (short) password. Bellovin and Merritt [1992] were the first to consider this, more challenging, setting: they show a number of attacks that can arise, and introduce a set of protocols for so-called "encrypted key exchange" (EKE) that have formed the basis for much future work in this area [Bellovin and Merritt 1993; Gong 1995; Steiner et al. 1995; Jablon 1997; Lucks 1997; Wu 1998 ]. Each of the works just mentioned, however, provides only informal security arguments for the protocols they propose; in fact, attacks against many of these protocols have been shown [Patel 1997; MacKenzie et al. 2000] , emphasizing the need for rigorous proofs of security in a formal, well-defined model.
Formal models of security for the password-only setting were given independently by Bellare et al. [2000] (building on Rogaway [1994, 1995] and Lucks [1997] ) and Boyko, et al. [2000] and MacKenzie et al. [2000] (building on Bellare et al. [1998] and Shoup [1999] ). Bellare et al. [2000] also present a proof of security for the two-flow protocol at the "core" of Diffie-Hellman-based EKE in the ideal cipher model, 1 while Boyko et al. [2000] introduce new RSA-and DiffieHellman-based protocols, and prove their security in the random oracle model. 2 Subsequently, Goldreich and Lindell [2006] introduced a different model of security for this setting and showed the first far, only -protocol for password-only key exchange which is provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions (and no ideal ciphers/random oracles); their protocol does not require any additional setup beyond the passwords shared by the parties. This work is remarkable in that it shows that password-based authentication is possible under very weak assumptions. On the other hand, their protocol does not lead to a practical solution as it requires techniques from generic two-party secure computation (making their protocol computationally inefficient) and concurrent zero-knowledge (making the round-complexity of their protocol prohibitive). Thus, their protocol should best be viewed as a feasibility result that does not settle the question of whether an efficient and practical solution is possible. Note that efficiency is particularly important in this setting, which is motivated by inherently practical considerations: that is, human users' inability to remember long keys. We also remark that the GoldreichLindell protocol, unlike the protocol presented here, does not tolerate concurrent executions of the protocol by the same party.
1.1. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS. As the above discussion indicates, previous protocols for password-only key exchange can be classified as either (1) having no rigorous proof of security; (2) having a rigorous proof of security based on standard cryptographic assumptions, but impractical; or (3) having a rigorous proof of security in an idealized model (such as the ideal cipher or random oracle models). We have already discussed why proofs of security are crucial in this setting, and why developing practical solutions to the problem of password-only key exchange is of great importance. As for the third class of solutions, it is widely recognized (see, e.g., Bellare and Rogaway [1993] , Canetti et al. [2004] , and Katz and Lindell [2007] ) that proofs of security in the various idealized models discussed earlier are useful as a "sanity check" insofar as they lend a measure of confidence to protocols whose security would otherwise only be heuristic, however, they do not provide an "iron-clad" guarantee of security in the real world. As an example [Canetti et al. 2004 ], a signature scheme is known which can be proven secure in these idealized models but for which any instantiation of the scheme in the real world (i.e., where the random oracle is instantiated by a cryptographic hash function) is insecure. Thus, proofs of security in idealized models are at best unsatisfying.
We present here the first protocol for password-only key exchange which is both practical and provably-secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. Security is proven in the model of Bellare et al. [2000] based on the decisional DiffieHellman assumption [Diffie and Hellman 1976] , a well-studied cryptographic assumption used in constructing and analyzing previous protocols for authenticated key-exchange (in the password-based setting and otherwise). Our protocol is remarkably efficient even when compared to the original key-exchange protocol of Diffie and Hellman-which, as we have noted, provides no authentication at all. Our protocol uses only three rounds of communication, and requires computation only (roughly) four times that of the Diffie-Hellman scheme.
Our protocol assumes public parameters available to all parties in the network. These parameters are assumed to be generated in a trusted manner by, say, the same entity who writes and deploys the software implementing the protocol. (This entity is anyway being trusted to implement the protocol correctly, and not to embed any malware or covert channels into the implementation.) The assumption of public parameters is significantly weaker-in both a theoretical and practical sense-than the "hybrid" model discussed earlier in which clients are required to store a public key for each server with whom they wish to communicate or, alternatively, to store the public key of a certificate authority (CA) who certifies servers' public keys. Advantages of using public parameters as opposed to public keys include: -The parameters required by our protocol can be generated in such a way that there is no "trapdoor" information associated with them. This, in turn, implies that there is no "master" secret key whose compromise would render the entire system insecure. -Avoiding the use of public keys avoids the need to handle revocation, and also eliminates the need to transmit certificates and verify certificate chains. -Once the public parameters are established, any client and server who share a password can use the protocol without having to obtain a certificate from a CA.
As an additional contribution, we propose a formal definition of forward secrecy for password-only key-exchange protocols that simplifies and unifies previous definitional work in this area. Roughly speaking, forward secrecy guarantees that a protocol remains secure even against an adversary who may obtain some clients' passwords and who may also change the passwords stored at various servers. It also guarantees protection against malicious clients (who may choose "bad" passwords in an attempt to learn other users' passwords). As an indication of what can go wrong in this stronger adversarial model, we show that a seemingly innocuous change to our protocol allows for an explicit attack by such an adversary. We then prove, however, that our protocol as specified does indeed achieve forward secrecy.
1.2. SUBSEQUENT PROGRESS. Due in large part to the practical significance and importance of password-based authentication, active research continues in this area. We only highlight those results most related to what is shown here. Perhaps most interesting in this regard is the work of Gennaro and Lindell [2006] , who make explicit the intuition underlying the core ideas of our construction and also present and prove secure an abstraction (as well as a generalization) of the framework we use; as corollaries of their work they obtain efficient protocols based on alternative number-theoretic assumptions. Nguyen and Vadhan [2008] show a simpler version of the Goldreich-Lindell protocol which achieves a weaker level of security than that considered in either [Goldreich and Lindell 2006] or here. Though their protocol is somewhat more efficient than that of Goldreich and Lindell [2006] , it relies on generic two-party secure computation and is therefore still not nearly efficient enough to be used in practice. Jiang and Gong [2004] show an efficient protocol for password-based key exchange based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption; the main advantage of their protocol in comparison to the one presented here is that their protocol achieves explicit mutual authentication in three rounds (whereas the protocol shown here would require an additional, fourth round). A stronger definition of security for password-based key exchange has been proposed [Canetti et al. 2005 ]; a protocol satisfying that stronger definition, building on the work here and in Gennaro and Lindell [2006] , is shown there as well. The above (in addition to Goldreich and Lindell [2006] and the present work) are the only schemes currently known with proofs of security under standard cryptographic assumptions.
More efficient variants of our protocol are suggested in Canetti et al. [2005] , Katz et al. [2005] , and Gennaro [2008] . Threshold variants of our protocol (in which the password is shared across multiple servers to defend against server compromise) have also been suggested [Di Raimondo and Gennaro 2003; Katz et al. 2005 ].
Definitions and Preliminaries
We begin with an informal overview of the model of security used here, intended primarily for those unfamiliar with this area. Section 2.2 contains a formal specification of the security model, following [Bellare et al. 2000] . In Section 2.3, we propose an extension to the basic security model which enables a rigorous definition of forward secrecy [Diffie et al. 1992] in the password-only setting. Section 2.4 reviews a number of cryptographic components used by our protocol.
2.1. INFORMAL OVERVIEW OF THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL. In our setting, two parties within a larger network who share a weak (low-entropy) password wish to authenticate each other and generate a cryptographically-strong session key to secure their future communication. They wish to do so in the presence of a powerful adversary who controls all communication in the network; this adversary may view, tamper with, deliver out-of-order, or refuse to deliver messages sent by the honest parties. The adversary may also initiate concurrent (arbitrarily-interleaved) executions of the protocol between the honest parties; during these executions, the adversary may attempt to impersonate one (or both) of the parties or may simply eavesdrop on honest executions of the protocol. The adversary may also expose multiple previous session keys in a way we describe below. The adversary succeeds (informally) if it can distinguish any session key generated by an honest party from a randomly chosen session key. The description above corresponds to the "basic" adversarial model formalized in Section 2.2. We may additionally consider an adversary who can corrupt parties and thereby either (1) obtain a client's password, or (2) modify the client's password stored on a server. We consider this type of adversary when defining "forward secrecy" in Section 2.3.
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A notion of security in the password-based setting must be defined carefully. Since, by their nature, passwords are chosen from a small space of possibilities, an adversary can always try each possible password one-by-one in an on-line impersonation attack; once the correct password is found, the adversary can clearly succeed in impersonating either party. With this in mind, we say a password-only protocol is secure if an exhaustive, on-line guessing attack of this sort is the best an adversary can do (cf. Definition 1). In particular, a secure protocol is resistant to off-line attacks in which an adversary passively monitors executions of the protocol and attempts to determine the correct password by examining the transcripts of these executions. A protocol satisfying our definition of security is also resilient to other types of attacks: for example, the definition rules out "man-in-the-middle" attacks in which an adversary shares a (separate) key with each party although the parties believe they have shared a (single) key with each other.
From a practical point of view, on-line attacks are the hardest for an adversary to mount, and they are also the easiest to detect. Furthermore, on-line attacks may be limited by, for example, shutting down a user's account after a certain number of failed authentication attempts. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the number of on-line attacks an adversary is able to execute is severely limited, while other attacks (e.g., eavesdropping, off-line password guessing) are not. In any case, as noted above, any password-based protocol can ultimately be broken by an on-line attack and so the present definition is the best one can hope for in the password-based setting.
2.2. DEFINITION OF SECURITY FOR PASSWORD-BASED AKE. We essentially follow the definition of Bellare et al. [2000] , which is based on prior work by Rogaway [1994, 1995] in the non password setting.
Participants, Passwords, and Initialization. We assume a fixed set 4 of protocol participants (also called principals or users) each of which is either a client C ∈ Client or a server S ∈ Server, where Client and Server are disjoint. Each C ∈ Client is assumed to have a password pw C , while each S ∈ Server is assumed to have a vector PW S = pw S,C C∈Client which contains the passwords of each of the clients. (The assumption that every client shares a password with every server is made merely for convenience. One could just as well assume that arbitrary pairs of users share passwords.)
Prior to any execution of the protocol we assume that an initialization phase occurs during which public parameters (if any) are established and passwords pw C are chosen for each client C. Recall that pw C is assumed to be a low-entropy secret; therefore, we assume that pw C (for each client C) is chosen independently and uniformly at random 5 from a "dictionary" D of size N , where N is a fixed constant which is independent of the security parameter. The correct passwords are then stored at each server so that pw S,C = pw C for all C ∈ Client and S ∈ Server.
In general, it is possible for additional information to be generated during this initialization phase. For example, in the "hybrid" model [Halevi and Krawczyk 1999; Boyarsky 1999 ] public/secret key pairs are generated for each server and the secret key is given as input to the appropriate server, while the public key is provided to all participants (and is also given to the adversary). For the protocol presented here, we require only the weaker requirement of a single set of public parameters which are provided to each party and also to the adversary.
Execution of the Protocol. In the real world, a protocol determines how principals behave in response to input from their environment. In the formal model, these inputs are provided by the adversary. Each principal is assumed to be able to execute the protocol multiple times (possibly concurrently) with different partners; this is modeled by allowing each principal to have an unlimited number of instances [Bellare and Rogaway 1995; Bellare et al. 2000] Partnering. Let C ∈ Client and S ∈ Server. We say that instances Advantage of the Adversary. Informally, the adversary succeeds if it can guess the bit b used by the Test oracle. Before formally defining the adversary's success, we must first define a notion of freshness. An instance i U is fresh unless one of the following is true at the conclusion of the experiment: (1) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(U, i); or (2) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(U , j), where j U and i U are partnered. We will allow the adversary to succeed only if its Test query is made to a fresh instance. Note that this is necessary for any reasonable definition of security; otherwise, the adversary could always succeed by, for example, submitting a Test query for an instance for which it had already submitted a Reveal query.
We say an adversary A succeeds if it makes a single query Test(U, i) to a fresh instance i U , with acc i U = TRUE at the time of this query, and outputs a bit b with b = b (recall that b is the bit chosen by the Test oracle). We denote this event by Succ. The advantage of adversary A in attacking protocol P is then given by:
where the probability is taken over the random coins used by the adversary as well as those used during the experiment (including the initialization phase).
It remains to define what we mean by a secure protocol. Note that a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary can always succeed by trying all passwords oneby-one in an on-line impersonation attack; this is possible since the size of the password dictionary is constant. Informally, a protocol is secure if this is the best an adversary can do. Formally, an instance i U represents an on-line attack if both the following are true at the time of the Test query: (1) at some point, the adversary queried Send(U, i, * ); and (2) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(U, i) or Test(U, i). In particular, instances with which the adversary interacts via Execute queries are not counted as on-line attacks. The number of on-line attacks represents a bound on the number of passwords the adversary could have tested in an on-line fashion. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 2.1. Protocol P is a secure protocol for password-only authenticated key-exchange if, for all dictionary sizes N and for all PPT adversaries A making at most Q(k) on-line attacks, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that:
The above definition ensures that the adversary can (essentially) do no better than guess a single password during each on-line attack. Calls to the Execute oracle, which are not included in Q(k), are of no help to the adversary in breaking the security of the protocol; this means that passive eavesdropping and off-line dictionary attacks are of no use.
We remark that some definitions of security (e.g., Bellare et al. [2000] , Goldreich and Lindell [2006] , and Nguyen and Vadhan [2008] ) allow the adversary to guess more than one password per on-line attempt. We believe the strengthening given by the above definition (in which the adversary can guess only a single password per on-line attempt) is important. The space of possible passwords is assumed small to begin with, so any degradation in security should be avoided if possible. Interestingly, for at least one protocol [Wu 1998 ] an explicit attack is known that allows an adversary to guess two passwords per on-line attack.
Extensions of the Definition. We briefly discuss two extensions of the previous definition.
More General Password Distributions. As noted in footnote 5, it is possible to consider more general classes of password distributions. For example, instead of assuming that passwords are chosen uniformly from a fixed dictionary D, we may instead take D to be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1 k , outputs a password pw. This allows both for non-uniform distributions, as well as a dependence on the security parameter. For a set S,
Then, Definition 2.1 would be modified, in the obvious way, to require that
It can be verified easily that the proof of security given for our protocol extends to the case where passwords are chosen as above. The requirement that passwords are generated by a polynomial-time algorithm D seems necessary for our proof, but it is not necessary for best-guess D(1 k ) (·) to be efficiently computable.
Explicit Mutual Authentication. The definitions we have given are intended only for protocols achieving implicit, rather than explicit, authentication. (Indeed, the protocol we present here achieves only implicit authentication.) If an honest party S interacts with some party U (who is either the intended partner C or an adversarial impersonator) then, very roughly speaking, S implicitly authenticates C if the session key sk that is generated by S is known to U if and only if U = C. In contrast, S explicitly authenticates C if the output (sk, acc) of S is such that sk is known to U and acc = 1 if and only if U = C.
This means that in the case of protocols for explicit authentication an adversary successfully attacks the protocol if it can either determine the session key held by some instance, or if it can cause an instance to output acc = TRUE even though that instance is not partnered with any other instance. A subtlety here is that partnering must be redefined so that instances are considered partnered if their session id's match except possibly for the final message; otherwise it would be trivial for an adversary to succeed by simply forwarding all messages of the protocol except the last between two honest parties. (See Bellare and Rogaway [1994] and Bellare et al. [2000] for further discussion.) We also now say that an instance i U represents an on-line attack if the adversary ever queried Send(U, i, * ) (i.e., without requiring the adversary to also make a Reveal of Test query for this instance).
Using pseudorandom functions in a standard way, it is easy to add explicit authentication to any protocol achieving implicit authentication [Bellare et al. 2000 ].
2.3. FORWARD SECRECY. The security definition of the previous section does not offer protection against an adversary who may compromise, say, a server and thereby either (1) obtain the password of a particular client, or (2) modify the value of a particular client's password stored by the server. Building on the framework of Bellare et al. [2000] , we provide a definition of forward secrecy which addresses these concerns. (Note that forward secrecy [Diffie et al. 1992 ] classically refers to ensuring security in case long-term secret information-e.g., passwords-are exposed. Following Bellare et al. [2000] , however, we additionally allow the adversary to modify long-term secret information.) A number of definitions of forward secrecy in the password-only setting have been proposed (e.g., four different notions of forward secrecy are mentioned in Bellare et al. [2000] alone); we believe our definition here simplifies and unifies previous definitional work.
To define forward secrecy, we must modify the basic model of the previous section in two orthogonal ways. First, we augment the adversarial model by introducing a new Corrupt oracle to which the adversary will be given access (actually, we will introduce two types of Corrupt oracles); this will allow us to model the adversarial actions listed above. Second, we modify the definition of security to obtain a meaningful definition (e.g., once an adversary obtains a client's password it can trivially impersonate that client regardless of what protocol is used; this must be reflected somehow in the security definition). Actually, we will only modify our definition of freshness; the rest of the definition will remain the same. We now discuss each of these changes in turn.
The Corruption Model. We introduce two new oracles to model the two types of attacks listed above. Oracle Corrupt 1 models the adversary's ability to learn clients' passwords: formally, Corrupt 1 (C) returns pw C for C ∈ Client.
6 Oracle Corrupt 2 models the adversary's ability to modify passwords stored on a server: formally, Corrupt 2 (S, C, pw) (for S ∈ Server and C ∈ Client) sets pw S,C := pw. We emphasize that the adversary can install different passwords on different servers for the same client. In the definition of Bellare et al. [2000] , an adversary who installs a password pw S,C also learns the "actual" password pw C ; we make no such assumption here (instead, the adversary must make an explicit Corrupt 1 query to obtain this password). In the case of a poorly administered server, it may be easy to modify clients' passwords without learning their "actual" passwords. The oracle query Corrupt 2 (S, C , pw) also models the case of a corrupt client C who selects his own password pw in an arbitrary manner, and then stores it on server S.
"Freshness". Introduction of the Corrupt oracles necessitates new definitions of partnering, freshness, and on-line attacks. Let C ∈ Client and S ∈ Server. We now say that instances (1) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(U, i) or Reveal(U , j) where j U and i U are partnered; (2) the adversary queried Corrupt 1 (U ) before a query Send(U, i, * ); or (3) the adversary queried Corrupt 1 (U ) or Corrupt 2 (U, U , * ) before a query Send(U, i, * ). The second and third conditions reflect the fact that if an adversary learns the password of some client C, then it can trivially impersonate any server to C, or C to any server; the third condition also reflects the fact that once the adversary sets the value of pw S,C to some known value, it can then impersonate C to S. Finally, we define on-line attack as follows:
-An instance i C with C ∈ Client represents an on-line attack if (1) the adversary queried Send(C, i, * ) before it queried Corrupt 1 (C); and (2) the adversary subsequently queried Reveal(C, i), Test(C, i), or Corrupt 1 (C).
-An instance i S with S ∈ Server and pid i S = C represents an on-line attack if (1) the adversary queried Send(S, i, * ) before it queried either Corrupt 1 (C) or Corrupt 2 (S, C); and (2) the adversary subsequently queried Reveal(S, i),
Although the above definition is slightly cumbersome, it exactly matches the intuitive notion of what an on-line attack is: the number of on-line attacks exactly represents the maximum number of "password guesses" the adversary can make, and we do not count as on-line attacks scenarios in which the adversary already "knows" the password being used by an instance (e.g., in case the adversary had already queried Corrupt 1 (C) before it makes a query Send(C, i)).
Having defined partnering, freshness, and on-line attacks, the remainder of the security definition is exactly as in the basic case. That is: -An adversary A succeeds (denoted by Succ) if it makes a single query Test(U, i) to a fresh instance -The advantage of adversary A in attacking protocol P is defined as
-Let P be a protocol for password-only authenticated key-exchange that is secure in the basic sense of Definition 2.1. We say P achieves forward secrecy if for all dictionary sizes N and all PPT adversaries A making at most Q(k) on-line attacks there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that:
We stress that although the above is syntactically equivalent to the basic definition given earlier, the differences are that A now has access to the two Corrupt oracles, and the notions of "freshness" and "on-line attacks" are modified appropriately.
2.4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BUILDING BLOCKS. We briefly review the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption as well as some cryptographic building blocks used in our protocol.
The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption. Let G be an efficient algorithm which, on input 1 k , outputs a description of a cyclic (multiplicative) group G of prime order q where furthermore |q| = k. We associate G with a description of this group, and assume for simplicity that q is implicit in G. Additionally, we assume that group operations (namely, multiplication, membership testing, and finding a generator) in groups output by G(1 k ) can be done in (expected) polynomial-time in k. Exponentiation and selecting a random group element can then also be done in polynomial time. We defer a concrete example of a candidate algorithm G to the end of this section.
We defineḠ def = G \ {1}; since the order of G is prime,Ḡ is exactly the set of generators of G. Given a generator g ∈Ḡ, a random group element can be selected by choosing x ∈ Z q uniformly at random and computing g x . If, instead, x is chosen uniformly at random from Z * q we obtain a random generator. Given a group G as above, we define the set of Diffie-Hellman tuples as all tuples of the form (g, h, g a , h a ) ∈Ḡ 4 where g and h are generators and a ∈ Z * q . We define the set of random tuples as all tuples of the form (g, h, g a , h b ) ∈Ḡ 4 where g and h are generators, a, b ∈ Z * q , and furthermore a = b. Informally, the DDH problem for a group G is to distinguish Diffie-Hellman tuples from random tuples, and the DDH problem is "hard" in G if no poly-time algorithm can solve the DDH problem in this group with probability much better than 1/2 (i.e., guessing at random). To be more formal, we must in fact talk about the hardness of the DDH problem in groups output by G. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.2. Given G as above, and for any algorithm D, define
We say the DDH problem is hard for
The DDH assumption is that there exists a G for which the DDH problem is hard. If G is a group output by some G for which the DDH problem is hard, we will sometimes (informally) say the DDH problem is hard in G.
A standard example of an algorithm G for which the DDH problem is believed to be hard is the following: on input 1 k choose primes p, q such that p = 2q + 1 and |q| = k; let G be the subgroup of quadratic residues in Z * p . Note that G has order q, as desired. Of course, other choices for G are also possible.
One-Time Signature Schemes. We provide a self-contained definition (following Goldwasser et al. [1988] ) of the type of signature scheme required by our protocol. Definition 2.3. A signature scheme is a triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) such that:
-The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1 k and returns verification key VK and signing key SK.
-The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a signing key SK and a message m, and returns a signature Sig. We denote this by Sig ← Sign SK (m). -The verification algorithm Vrfy is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a verification key VK, a message m, and a signature Sig and returns a single bit. We denote this by b = Vrfy VK (m, Sig).
We require that for all k, all (VK, SK) output by Gen(1 k ), all m, and all Sig output by Sign SK (m), we have Vrfy VK (m, Sig) = 1. The following definition describes the level of security which the signature scheme used in our protocol must satisfy. The required level of security is relatively weak; thus, signature schemes meeting this level of security are not only easy to construct, but can also be more efficient than typical signature schemes used in practice (which usually satisfy the stronger security notion introduced by Goldwasser et al. [1988] ).
Definition 2.4.
= (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is a secure one-time signature scheme if the following is negligible for all PPT algorithms F:
where F makes only a single query to Sign SK (·) and we require that Sig was not previously output by Sign SK (·) on input m.
The above corresponds to what is sometimes termed a "strong" signature scheme, in that it is also infeasible for the adversary to output a different (valid) signature corresponding to the same message m that it submitted to its signing oracle.
A secure (strong) one-time signature scheme may be constructed based on any one-way function, and hence may be based on the DDH assumption (which implies the discrete-logarithm assumption and hence a one-way function).
Collision-Resistant Hashing. Informally, a function H is collision-resistant if it is infeasible to find any x = x for which H (x) = H (x ). Formally, let CRHF be an efficient algorithm which, on input 1 k , outputs a description of an efficient hash function H mapping {0, 1}
* to {0, 1} k . We say that CRHF is a collision-resistant hash family if the following is negligible for all PPT algorithms A:
For our application, we will actually require that the H output by CRHF map strings to Z q for some given q of length k. However, it is easy to modify any collisionresistant hash family as described above to obtain one satisfying this requirement. A collision-resistant hash family may be constructed based on the DDH assumption (in fact, the weaker discrete-logarithm assumption suffices) [Damgård 1988 ].
Cramer-Shoup Encryption Using Labels. The Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme [Cramer and Shoup 2003 ] was the first known example of a practical encryption scheme with a rigorous proof of security against chosen-ciphertext attacks under standard cryptographic assumptions. Our protocol relies on a modification of the Cramer-Shoup scheme, described here for convenience. For completeness, we also provide a definition of security against chosen-ciphertext attacks incorporating the notion of labels (see Shoup [2001] ). We rely on this definition in the proof of security for our protocol.
Before continuing, we emphasize that our protocol does not use the (modified) Cramer-Shoup scheme for encryption per se. Indeed, in our application no party publishes a public key or holds any secret key associated with the scheme, and "decryption" is never performed during execution of our protocol. Our proof of security, however, does rely on the fact that decryption is possible. Gennaro and Lindell [2006] have since shown that this feature is not essential, and that nonmalleable commitment [Dolev et al. 2000] suffices. 7 We first define the semantics of public-key encryption with labels. We require that for all k, all pk, sk output by KeyGen(1 k ), any LABEL, all m in the (implicit) message space, and any C output by E pk (LABEL, m) we have
Our definition of security against (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext attacks is standard [Shoup 2001 ]. In the following, we define a left-or-right encryption oracle
Definition 2.6. A public-key encryption scheme (KeyGen, E, D) is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks if the following is negligible for all PPT algorithms A: We now describe our modification of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. On input 1 k , the key-generation algorithm KeyGen first runs G(1 k ) to generate a group G (as described earlier in the context of the DDH assumption); it also selects random generators g 1 , g 2 ←Ḡ. Next, it selects three pairs (z 1 , z 2 ), (x 1 , x 2 ), (y 1 , y 2 ) at random from the set {(a, b) ∈ Z q × Z q | g . Finally, it runs CRHF(1 k ) to generate a hash function H , where CRHF is a collision-resistant hash family as described above. The public key consists of G, g 1 , g 2 , h, c, d, H ; the secret key is z 1 , z 2 , x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 ; and the message space is G.
To encrypt a message m ∈ G using label LABEL, the sender chooses a random r ∈ Z q and computes u 1 = g r 1 , u 2 = g r 2 , and e = h r m. It then sets α = H (LABEL|u 1 |u 2 |e) and outputs the ciphertext u 1 |u 2 |e|(cd α ) r . To decrypt a ciphertext u 1 |u 2 |e|v using label LABEL, the receiver first verifies that all components of the ciphertext lie in G. If not, it outputs ⊥; otherwise, it then computes α = H (LABEL|u 1 |u 2 |e) and checks whether u Figure 1 , and a more detailed description follows. A completely formal specification of the protocol appears in Section 3.2, where we give a proof of security for the protocol in the "basic" adversarial model of Section 2.2. In Section 3.3 we show that the protocol does not achieve forward secrecy if it is modified in a seemingly-innocuous way (this is meant to motivate our definition of forward secrecy, as well as to illustrate the importance of rigorous proofs of security). Then, we prove that the protocol as formally defined does achieve forward secrecy.
The protocol as described here is different from what appears in previous versions of this work [Katz 2002; Katz et al. 2001 Katz et al. , 2002 ], as we have introduced small modifications in order to simplify the proof of security (the proofs of security given previously are, however, correct). These modifications do not significantly affect the efficiency of the protocol, nor do they necessitate additional assumptions.
Initialization. For security parameter k, the public parameters contain a group G (written multiplicatively) having prime order q with |q| = k; we assume the hardness of the DDH problem in G. Additionally, the parameters include random generators g 1 , g 2 , h, c, d ∈Ḡ and a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z q chosen at random from a collision-resistant hash family.
FIG. 1.
A protocol for password-only authenticated key exchange. The client name is Client, the server name is Server, and we let PIDs := " Client | Server". The first and second messages of the protocol are called msg 1 and msg 2 , respectively.
As part of the initialization, a password pw C is chosen randomly for each client C, and pw C is stored by each server (cf. Section 2.2). We assume that all passwords lie in G or can be mapped in a one-to-one fashion to G; this is typically easy: for example, if passwords are represented as integers less than q then the password pw can be mapped to g pw 1 ∈ G. For ease of exposition, we will simply assume that passwords lie in the set {g 1 1 , . . . , g N 1 } where N represents the size of the dictionary from which passwords are chosen. (We also implicitly assume that N < q, which will certainly be true in practice.)
Protocol Execution. When a client Client ∈ Client with password pw C wants to connect to a server Server ∈ Server, the client computes a Cramer-Shoup "encryption" of pw C , as described in Section 2.4, using a particular value for the label. In more detail, let PIDs denote the string " Client | Server". The client begins by running a key-generation algorithm for a one-time signature scheme, giving VK and SK. The client chooses random r 1 ∈ Z q and computes A = g to the server as the first message of the protocol. Note that this corresponds roughly to an "encryption" of pw C using the label PIDs |VK. Upon receiving the message msg 1 (as above), the server computes a CramerShoup "encryption" of pw C (where pw C is the password corresponding to the client named in the incoming message) using a particular value for the label. In more detail, the server first chooses random x 2 , y 2 , z 2 , w 2 ∈ Z q , computes α = H ( PIDs |VK|A|B|C), and sets E = g
Additionally, a random r 2 ∈ Z q is chosen and the server computes F = g r 2 1 , G = g r 2 2 , and I = h r 2 · pw C . The server then computes β = H (msg 1 | Server |E|F|G|I ) and sets J = (cd β ) r 2 . The server sends msg 2 def = Server|E|F|G|I |J to the client as the second message of the protocol. Note that this process corresponds roughly to an "encryption" of pw C using the label msg 1 | Server |E.
Upon receiving the message msg 2 , the client chooses random x 1 , y 1 , z 1 , w 1 ∈ Z q , computes β = H (msg 1 | Server |E|F|G|I ), and sets K = g
The client then signs msg 1 |msg 2 |K using the secret key SK that it generated in the first step of the protocol. The value K and the resulting signature are sent as the final message of the protocol. At this point, the client accepts and determines the session key by first computing I = I / pw C and then setting sk C = E r 1 F x 1 G y 1 (I ) z 1 J w 1 . Upon receiving K |Sig, the server first checks that Sig is a valid signature of msg 1 |msg 2 |K under VK. If so, the server accepts and determines the session key by computing C = C/ pw S,C and then setting sk S = A x 2 B y 2 (C ) z 2 D w 2 K r 2 . Otherwise, the server terminates without accepting and the session key remains NULL.
Although omitted in the above description, we assume that the client and server always check that incoming messages are well-formed. In particular, when the server receives the first message it verifies that Client ∈ Client and that A, B, C, D ∈ G (recall that membership in G can be efficiently verified). When the client receives the second message, it verifies that the server name included in the message is indeed the name of the server to whom the client desired to connect, and that E, F, G, I, J ∈ G. Finally, when the server receives the last message it verifies that K ∈ G in addition to verifying correctness of the signature. If an ill-formed message is ever received, the receiving party terminates immediately without accepting and the session key remains NULL. For further details, see the formal description of the protocol in Figures 3 and 4 , below.
Correctness. In an honest execution of the protocol, the client and the server calculate identical session keys. To see this, note that in an honest execution we have α = α , β = β , and the same password pw C is used by both parties. Thus, 
Therefore:
and the session keys are equal.
Achieving Explicit Authentication. As described, the protocol does not achieve explicit mutual authentication (i.e., a party does not know whether its intended partner has successfully computed a matching session key). It is easy to add explicit authentication using standard techniques (see, e.g., Bellare et al. [2000] ).
Efficiency Considerations. Some remarks about the computational efficiency of the above scheme are in order. First, efficiency of the signature computation can be improved using an on-line/off-line signature scheme [Even et al. 1996] , where the off-line computation is done while the client is waiting for the server to respond. Also, the data being signed (namely, msg 1 |msg 2 |K ) could clearly be hashed using H before signature computation. By swapping the roles of the client and server (so that the server sends the first message in Figure 1 ), the server can use long-term public-/private-keys (for a signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks [Goldwasser et al. 1988] ) and thereby avoid having to run the key-generation algorithm each time the protocol is executed. We stress that in this case we do not require that the client store the server's long-term public key; instead, the public key is included in the first message from the server but the protocol will be secure even if an active adversary replaces this key with one of his own choosing.
Algorithms for simultaneous multiple exponentiation [Menezes et al. 1996, Chapter 14] can be used to speed up the computation in the protocol. If this is done, the computation for each user is (roughly) 7-8 exponentiations in G (ignoring the effects of the signature scheme), as compared to the 2 exponentiations per user in standard Diffie-Hellman key exchange [Diffie and Hellman 1976] , which provides no authentication at all.
Further efficiency improvements are discussed in Canetti et al. [2005] , Katz et al. [2005] , and Gennaro [2008] .
3.2. PROOF OF SECURITY. We first provide a formal specification of the protocol by specifying the initialization phase and the oracles to which the adversary has access. During the initialization phase for security parameter k (cf. Figure 2) , algorithm Initialize first runs an algorithm G to generate a group G of prime order q with |q| = k. Next, generators g 1 , g 2 , h, c, d ∈Ḡ are selected at random, and a hash function H is chosen from a collision-resistant hash family CRHF. Furthermore, the sets Client and Server are determined using some (arbitrary) algorithm UserGen. Passwords for each client are chosen at random as discussed in the previous section; the passwords for each client are then stored at each server.
A formal specification of the Execute, Reveal, and Test oracles appears in Figure 3 . The description of the Execute oracle matches the high-level protocol description of Figure 1 Figure 4 . Although the model technically has only one type of Send oracle (see Section 2.2), the adversary's queries to this oracle can be viewed as queries to four different oracles Send 0 , . . . , Send 3 representing the four different types of messages which may be sent as part of the protocol (this includes the three message types shown in Figure 1 as well as an "initiate" message). The third argument to each oracle is denoted by msg-in. In the proof that follows, we will also sometimes refer to msg 1 , msg 2 , msg 3 , where these refer to messages having the correct format for rounds 1, 2, and 3, respectively. We will also use these to denote messages input to the Send 1 , Send 2 , or Send 3 oracles, respectively, or output by the Send 0 , Send 1 , or Send 2 oracles, respectively. THEOREM 3.1. Assuming (1) the DDH problem is hard for G; (2) (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is a secure one-time signature scheme; and (3) CRHF is a collision-resistant hash family, the protocol of Figure 1 is a secure protocol for password-only authenticated key exchange.
Since one-time signature schemes as well as collision-resistant hash functions may be constructed based on the DDH assumption (cf. Section 2.4), we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 3.2. Under the DDH assumption, there exists a secure protocol for password-only authenticated key exchange.
Before giving the formal details, we describe the high-level structure of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Let P 0 denote the "real-world" experiment where an adversary attacks the actual protocol. We introduce a sequence of transformations to this experiment, and bound the effect of each transformation on the adversary's advantage. We then bound the adversary's advantage in the final experiment; this yields a bound on the adversary's advantage when attacking the original protocol.
In experiment P 2 (obtained by a sequence of modifications to P 0 ), all session keys computed in response to an Execute query are chosen uniformly at random and the password is not used at all; Send queries are treated exactly as in P 0 . It is not too difficult to see that the adversary's advantage cannot change significantly in moving from P 0 to P 2 , since the "core" of an honest execution of the protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol (and Execute queries correspond to passive eavesdropping on a protocol execution), and the password is anyway "encrypted" using Cramer-Shoup encryption.
In experiment P 3 , we (informally) consider the adversary to have succeeded as soon as it interacts with a client or server using the "correct" value of the password. (Thus, the adversary may now succeed even without guessing the correct value of b.) This can only increase the advantage of the adversary.
Experiment P 5 (preceded by an intermediate experiment P 4 for technical reasons) is really the crux of the proof. Roughly speaking, we now define the experiment so that whenever the adversary interacts with a server using an incorrect value of the password the server chooses a session key uniformly at random. We then prove that this has no effect on the adversary's advantage, in an informationtheoretic sense; expressed differently, this means that the session key computed by a server in experiment P 3 -hen the adversary interacts with a server using an incorrect value of the password-is uniformly distributed from the adversary's point of view.
In experiment P 6 , we now have the server compute the first message of the protocol (in response to a Send query) independently of the actual password.
Relying on the security of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme, we show that this cannot significantly affect the adversary's advantage.
Experiments P 7 and P 8 are analogous to experiments P 5 and P 6 , but focusing on client-instances rather than server-instances.
In experiment P 8 , we notice that the adversary's view is independent of any actual passwords except for the fact that the adversary succeeds (as per the modification introduced in experiment P 3 ) as soon as it interacts with a party using a "correct" password; this event therefore occurs with probability at most Q(k)/N . Furthermore, if this event does not happen then the bit b is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary (since all session keys are chosen uniformly at random), and so the adversary succeeds with probability exactly half. The overall probability that the adversary succeeds in experiment P 8 is thus at most
The analysis of the above sequence of experiments shows that the adversary's success probability in the original experiment is at most negligibly greater than this.
We now give the formal details.
PROOF. Throughout the proof, we will refer to the formal specification of the protocol as it appears in Figures 2-4 . It is always the case that pw Server,Client = pw Client for all Client ∈ Client and Server ∈ Server; furthermore, during execution of the Send 3 oracle it is always the case that pw = pw Client . (This will not necessarily be true when considering forward secrecy; see the following section.) Given an adversary A, we imagine a simulator that runs the protocol for A. More precisely, the simulator begins by running algorithm Initialize(1 k ) (which includes choosing passwords for clients) and giving the public output of the algorithm to A. When A queries an oracle, the simulator responds by executing the appropriate algorithm as in Figures 3 and 4 ; the simulator also records all state information defined during the course of the experiment. In particular, when the adversary queries the Test oracle, the simulator chooses (and records) the random bit b. When the adversary completes its execution and outputs a bit b , the simulator can tell whether the adversary succeeds by checking whether (1) [·] denotes the probability of an event when the simulator interacts with the adversary A in accordance with experiment P. We refer to the real execution of the experiment, as described above, as P 0 . We introduce a sequence of transformations to the original experiment and bound the effect of each transformation on the adversary's advantage. We then bound the adversary's advantage in the final experiment; this yields a bound on the adversary's advantage in the original experiment.
We begin with some terminology that will be used throughout the proof. A given msg 1 is called oracle-generated if it was output by the simulator in response to some oracle query (whether a Send 0 or Execute query). This message is said to be adversarially generated otherwise. These notions are defined analogously for a given msg 2 . A verification key contained in an oracle-generated msg 1 is called an oracle-generated verification key. Experiment P 0 . In experiment P 0 , the simulator interacts with the adversary as before except that the adversary does not succeed, and the experiment is aborted, if any of the following occur:
(1) At any point, an oracle-generated verification key is used more than once.
In particular, the experiment is aborted if an oracle-generated msg 1 is ever repeated. (2) At any point during the experiment, an oracle-generated msg 2 is repeated. (3) At any point, the adversary forges a new, valid message/signature pair with respect to any oracle-generated verification key. (4) At any point during the experiment, a collision occurs in the hash function H (regardless of whether this is due to a direct action of the adversary, or whether this occurs during the course of the simulator's response to an oracle query).
It is immediate that event 2 occurs with negligible probability. It is also straightforward to show that events 1, 3, and 4 occur with negligible probability assuming the security of (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) as a one-time signature scheme and the security of CRHF as a collision-resistant hash family. We omit the obvious details.
Putting everything together, we see that Adv A,P 0 (k) − Adv A,P 0 (k) is negligible.
Experiment P 1 . In experiment P 1 , the simulator interacts with the adversary as in P 0 except that the adversary's queries to the Execute oracle are handled differently: for each Execute query the values C and I are computed as C := h r 1 · g N +1 1
and
is not a valid password. Furthermore, the session keys are computed as
The following bounds the effect this transformation can have on the adversary's advantage.
The proof of the claim relies on the semantic security of the (modified) CramerShoup encryption scheme (which is implied by its security against chosenciphertext attacks). 8 We show that the simulator can use A as a subroutine to distinguish encryptions of the correct client passwords from encryptions of g N +1 1
. The simulator is given a public key pk = G, g 1 , g 2 , h, c, d , H for an instance of the Cramer-Shoup scheme and may repeatedly query an encryption oracle E pk,b (·, ·, ·) whereb is a randomly-chosen bit (unknown to the simulator). The advantage of the simulator in attacking the encryption scheme is the absolute value of the difference between the probability the simulator outputs 1 whenb = 1 and the probability the simulator outputs 1 whenb = 0. The simulator begins by running the following modified initialization protocol:
Efficient and Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Using Weak
The simulator responds to Send, Reveal, and Test queries as in experiments P 0 and P 1 . However, it responds to Execute queries as shown in Figure 5 . In words: each time the simulator responds to an Execute query it constructs the values A, B, C, D and F, G, I, J using its encryption oracle by querying this oracle using the appropriate label, and the correct password and g N +1 1 as its two "messages". When A terminates, the simulator outputs 1 if and only if A succeeds.
It is easy to see that whenb = 0 the actions of the Execute oracle are exactly as in experiment P 0 , while ifb = 1 the actions of the Execute oracle are exactly as in experiment P 1 . (In comparing Figures 3 and 5 , it will be helpful to recall that when responding to an Execute query, pw Client is always equal to pw Server,Client and furthermore sk and
. One can also verify that whenb = 0 the session keys are computed as in experiment P 0 , while ifb = 1 the session keys are computed as in experiment P 1 .
The simulator's advantage in attacking the Cramer-Shoup scheme is therefore
The claim follows since this is negligible under the DDH assumption.
Experiment P 2 . In experiment P 2 , the simulator interacts with the adversary as in P 1 except that during queries Execute(Client, i, Server, j) the session key sk i Client is chosen uniformly at random from G; session key sk j Server is set equal to sk
We will show that the distribution on the view of the adversary is identical in experiments P 1 and P 2 . For any particular Execute query made by the adversary in experiment P 1 , we may write C = h r 1 · pw Client with r 1 = r 1 (recall from Figure 3 that r 1
. Now, for any μ, ν ∈ G and fixing the random choices for the remainder of experiment P 1 , the probability over choice of x 2 , y 2 , z 2 , w 2 that E = μ and sk i Client = ν is exactly the probability that
where we use the fact that g 1 is a generator. Viewing Eqs. (2) and (3) as equations over Z q in the variables x 2 , y 2 , z 2 , w 2 , we see that they are linearly independent and not identically zero since r 1 = r 1 (here, we use the fact that h is a generator and hence log g 1 h = 0). Thus, the desired probability is 1/q 2 . In other words, the value of sk i Client is independent of the value of E and hence independent of the remainder of experiment P 1 . Thus, the adversary's view in experiment P 1 is distributed identically to the adversary's view in experiment P 2 . The claim follows.
In experiment P 2 , the adversary's probability of correctly guessing the bit b used by the Test oracle is exactly 1/2 if the Test query is made to a fresh instance that was activated using an Execute query. This is so because session keys for such instances in P 2 are chosen at random from G, and hence there is no way to distinguish whether the Test oracle outputs a random session key or the "actual" session key (which is just a random element, anyway). Hence, the remainder of the proof concentrates on instances that are invoked via Send queries (which is the more difficult case to consider).
Experiment P 3 . In experiment P 3 , the simulator first runs the following modified initialization procedure and stores the values κ, χ 1 , χ 2 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 for future use.
The simulator's handling of Send oracle queries in P 3 will also change, but before describing this we introduce some terminology. For a query Send 1 ( Server, j, msg 1 ) where msg 1 is adversarially-generated, let msg 1 = Client|VK|A|B|C|D and α = H ( PIDs |VK|A|B|C).
κ , then msg 1 is said to be invalid. Otherwise, msg 1 is said to be valid. Similarly, for a query Send 2 ( Client, i, msg 2 ) where msg 2 is adversariallygenerated, let msg 2 = Server|E|F|G|I |J and β be as defined in Figure 4 . If either F χ 1 +βξ 1 G χ 2 +βξ 2 = J or I / pw Client = F κ then msg 2 is said to be invalid. Otherwise, msg 2 is said to be valid. Informally, valid messages are encryptions of the correct password while invalid messages are not. Note that the simulator can efficiently determine whether any given adversarially generated message is valid because it knows κ, χ 1 , χ 2 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 .
Given this terminology, we continue with our description of experiment P 3 . When the adversary makes oracle query Send 2 ( Client, i, msg 2 ), the simulator examines msg 2 . If msg 2 is adversarially-generated and valid, the query is answered as in P 2 except that sk i Client is assigned 9 the special value ∇. In any other case (i.e., msg 2 is oracle-generated, or adversarially-generated but invalid), the query is answered exactly as in experiment P 2 .
When the adversary queries Send 3 ( Server, j, msg 3 ), the simulator examines msg 1 = first-msg-in for instance j Server .
10 If msg 1 is adversarially-generated and valid, the query is answered as in experiment P 2 except that sk j Server is assigned the special value ∇. In any other case (i.e., msg 1 is oracle-generated, or adversarially generated but invalid), the query is answered exactly as in experiment P 2 .
Finally, the definition of the adversary's success in P 3 is changed. If the adversary ever queries Reveal(U, i) or Test(U, i) where sk i U = ∇, the simulator halts and the adversary succeeds. Otherwise, the adversary's success is determined as in experiment P 2 .
The distribution of the public parameters is identical in experiments P 2 and P 3 . Furthermore, the distributions on the adversary's view in experiments P 2 and P 3 are identical up to the point when the adversary queries Reveal(U, i) or Test(U, i) with sk i U = ∇; if such a query is never made, the distributions on the view are identical. Since the adversary succeeds if such a query ever occurs, the claim follows.
Experiment P 4 . In experiment P 4 , we again modify the simulator's response to a Send 3 query. Upon receiving query Send 3 (Server, j, K |Sig ), the simulator examines msg 1 = first-msg-in for instance j Server . If msg 1 is oracle-generated and a value is to be assigned to sk In any other case, the query is answered as in experiment P 3 .
That there exists a unique pair Client, i with sid
Server in the situation above follows from the fact that, assuming sk j Server is to be assigned a value -and so in particular the simulation is not aborted-the following hold: (1) there is a unique pair Client, i such that instance i Client uses VK, where VK is the verification key contained in msg 1 (this is a consequence of msg 1 being oracle-generated, and the fact that the simulator aborts if an oracle-generated verification key is ever used twice); furthermore, (2) this pair satisfies sid i Client = sid j Server (this is a consequence of the fact that the simulator aborts if a signature forgery occurs).
Since sid
Experiment P 5 . In experiment P 5 , we again modify the simulator's response to a Send 3 query. Upon receiving query Send 3 (Ser ver , j, K |Sig ), the simulator examines msg 1 = first-msg-in for the same instance j Server . If msg 1 is adversarially-generated and invalid, the session key sk j Server is assigned a value randomly chosen from G. In all other cases, the query is answered as in experiment P 4 . CLAIM 3.6. Adv A,P 5 (k) = Adv A,P 4 (k).
We prove the claim by showing that the distributions on the adversary's view in the two experiments are identical. For a given query Send 3 (Ser ver , j, K |Sig ) where msg 1 = first-msg-in = Client|VK|A|B|C|D is adversarially generated and invalid, let msg 2 = first-msg-out = Ser ver |E|F|G|I |J and α = H (PI Ds |VK|A|B|C). Since msg 1 is invalid, either A χ 1 +αξ 1 B χ 2 +αξ 2 = D or else C/pw Client = A κ (or possibly both). For any μ, ν ∈ G and fixing the randomness used in the rest of experiment P 4 , the probability over choice of x, y, z, w that E = μ and sk j Server = ν is exactly the probability that log
using the fact that g 1 is a generator. Consider two cases depending on the value of log g 1 A. If log g 1 A = 0, then since msg 1 is invalid at least one of the values log g 1 B, log g 1 (C/ pw Client ), or log g 1 D is not equal to 0. One can verify that Eqs. (4) and (5), viewed as equations over Z q in the variables x, y, z, w, are linearly independent and not identically zero. If log g 1 A = 0, it can be similarly verified that Eqs. (4) and (5) are linearly independent and not identically zero. In either case, then, the desired probability is 1/q 2 . Thus, the value of sk j Server is independent of the value of E and hence independent of the remainder of the experiment.
Before describing the next experiment, let us first summarize where things stand in experiment P 5 . In responding to a query Send 3 (S, j, msg 3 ) in that experiment, the simulator does not need to use the value r (stored as part of the internal state for instance j S ) to compute the value of the session key. In particular, if msg 1 was the initial message sent to this instance then: (1) If msg 1 is adversarially generated and valid, the simulator sets sk j S equal to ∇ as described in experiment P 3 ; (2) if msg 1 is oracle-generated, the simulator sets sk j S equal to the session key for the partnered client instance as described in experiment P 4 ; (3) if msg 1 is adversarially-generated and invalid, the simulator chooses sk j S at random as described in experiment P 5 . Experiment P 6 . In experiment P 6 , we modify the simulator's response to Send 1 queries. Now, I is computed as h r g
, where the dictionary of legal passwords is {1, . . . , N }; note that g
is not a valid password since N < q.
A proof of the claim relies on the security of the (modified) Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks; cf. Section 2.4. We show that the simulator can use A as a subroutine in order to distinguish encryptions of the correct client password(s) from encryptions of g N +1 1
. The simulator is given a public key pk = G, g 1 , g 2 , h, c, d, H for an instance of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme and may repeatedly query an encryption oracle E pk,b (·, ·, ·) whereb is a randomly chosen bit (unknown to the simulator). The simulator may also repeatedly query a decryption oracle D sk (·, ·) subject to the restriction stated in Definition 6. By definition, the advantage of the simulator in attacking the encryption scheme is the absolute value of the difference between the probability the simulator outputs 1 whenb = 1 and the probability the simulator outputs 1 whenb = 0.
The simulator begins by running the following modified initialization protocol:
The simulator responds to Send 0 , Execute, Reveal, and Test oracle queries as in experiments P 5 and P 6 . The simulator responds to Send 1 , Send 2 , and Send 3 queries as shown in Figure 6 . In words:
-In responding to a Send 1 query the simulator no longer computes the values F, G, I, J on its own. Instead, it queries its encryption oracle using (1) the appropriate label, and (2) the correct password and g N +1 1
as its two "messages." It then uses the ciphertext F|G|I |J returned by this oracle to construct msg-out.
-In responding to a Send 3 query, the simulator first checks whether msg 1 = first-msg-in is oracle-or adversarially-generated. If msg 1 is oracle-generated, the session key is computed by finding the partnered client instance (as discussed above). If msg 1 is adversarially-generated, the simulator determines whether msg 1 is valid or invalid using its decryption oracle and then sets the session key appropriately. -In responding to a Send 2 query, the simulator uses its decryption oracle (as needed) to determine whether an adversarially-generated incoming message is valid or invalid.
Note that the simulator never need submit to its decryption oracle an "illegal" query (i.e., a ciphertext that it previously received from its encryption oracle) since the simulator never needs to check whether oracle-generated messages are valid or invalid. Finally, the simulator outputs 1 if and only if A succeeds. Examination of Figure 6 shows that the Send 2 and Send 3 oracles behave exactly the same as in both experiments P 5 and P 6 . On the other hand, whenb = 0 the actions of the Send 1 oracle are as in experiment P 5 , while ifb = 1 then the actions of the Send 1 oracle are as in experiment P 6 . The simulator's advantage in attacking the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is therefore exactly Pr A,P 5 [Succ] − Pr A,P 6 [Succ] . The claim follows since this advantage is negligible under the DDH assumption, since the Cramer-Shoup scheme is secure given this assumption (cf. Section 2.4). Experiment P 7 . In experiment P 7 , queries to the Send 2 oracle are handled differently. In response to a query Send 2 ( Client, i, msg 2 ), if msg 2 is either oraclegenerated or adversarially generated but invalid, the session key sk i Client is assigned a value chosen randomly from G.
We prove the claim by showing that the distributions on the adversary's view are identical in the two experiments. Consider a particular query Send 2 (Client, i, msg 2 ) in P 6 . Regardless of whether msg 2 is oracle-generated or adversarially-generated but invalid, it is the case that either
A proof similar to that used in proving Claim 3.6 then shows that sk i Client in experiment P 6 is uniformly distributed in G, independent of the rest of the experiment.
Experiment P 8 . In experiment P 8 , we modify the simulator's response to Send 0 queries. Now, C is computed as C := h r g N +1 1
; note that g N +1 1
is not a valid password. (This modification parallels the change made in going from experiment P 5 to experiment P 6 .) CLAIM 3.9. Under the DDH assumption, |Adv A,
The proof exactly follows that of Claim 3.7. In particular, note that in responding to a query Send 2 (C, i, msg 2 ) in experiment P 7 , the simulator never requires the value r (stored as part of the internal state for instance i C ) to compute a session key: if msg 2 is oracle-generated, the session key is assigned a randomly chosen value; if msg 2 is adversarially generated and invalid (which can be verified using the decryption oracle), the session key is also assigned a randomly chosen value; finally, if msg 2 is adversarially generated and valid (which can again be verified using the decryption oracle), the session key is assigned ∇. Oracle queries to Send 3 can also be answered by the simulator, using its decryption oracle as necessary. Finally, there is never a need for the simulator to make an "illegal" query its decryption oracle. The claim follows:
The adversary's view in experiment P 8 is independent of the passwords chosen by the simulator until one of the following occur: -The adversary queries Reveal ( Client, i) U is randomly-distributed in G independent of A's view; the probability of correctly guessing b in this case is therefore exactly 1/2.
The preceding discussion implies that
and thus the adversary's advantage in experiment P 8 is at most Q(k)/N . The sequence of claims proven above show that
for some negligible function ε(·) and therefore the adversary's advantage in P 0 (i.e., the original protocol) is at most Q(k)/N plus some negligible quantity. This completes the proof of the theorem.
3.3. PROOF OF FORWARD SECRECY. We first demonstrate a potential attack on the protocol (in the stronger adversarial model of Section 2.3) if it is modified in a seemingly innocuous way. Then, we show a proof that the protocol as formally defined does indeed achieve forward secrecy.
Consider the following change to the protocol as described in the previous section: when responding to a Send 1 query, a server no longer stores pw S,C as part of its state information (cf. Figure 4) . Now, when a server responds to a Send 3 query it simply sets pw = pw S,C . In other words, instead of using the password stored as part of its (temporary, volatile) state information, the server simply uses the value of the client's password as stored in its long-term memory (e.g., the password file).
We now show that this simple change introduces a vulnerability in the attack model described in Section 2.3. Fix a client Client. The attack begins by having the adversary impersonate Client to a server S using an arbitrary password, say pw = g 1 . That is, the adversary generates VK, chooses a random r 1 , computes
, C = h r 1 · g 1 , and D = (cd α ) r 1 (for α computed in the appropriate way), and sends Client|VK|A|B|C|D to server S. The server will respond with a message S|E|F|G|I |J (which is computed using password pw S,Client = pw Client ). Next, the adversary changes the password stored at S for Client (i.e., pw S,Client ) to the value g 1 using oracle call Corrupt 2 (S, Client, g 1 ). Finally, the adversary computes the final message of the protocol just as a legitimate client would by choosing
w 1 (for β computed in the appropriate way), and sending K |Sig . Finally, the adversary obtains sk S for this instance of the server using a Reveal query.
We claim that the adversary can determine pw Client -the original password of the client -and hence successfully impersonate Client to a different server S = S. To see this, note that when S computes the session key after receiving the final message of the protocol it uses pw S,Client = g 1 (which, recall, is different from the password the server used to compute the second message of the protocol). Thus,
(where x 2 , y 2 , z 2 , w 2 , r 2 are values used by the server which are unknown to the adversary). Since the adversary can compute E r 1 itself, the adversary can use sk S to determine the value K r 2 = sk S /E r 1 . By exhaustively searching the password dictionary, the adversary can identify pw Client as the unique value for which:
The protocol as formally specified in the previous section is not vulnerable to this attack since it ensures that a server-instance uses the same password throughout its execution by storing the client's password as part of the state information for that instance. Interestingly, this means that it is possible for two server-instances active at the same time to be using different passwords for a given client (the password being used will be determined by the value of pw S,C at the time the initial Send 1 query for each instance was made).
We now provide a rigorous proof that the protocol as specified achieves forward secrecy. PROOF. A significant portion of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1, and so we will focus only on the differences here. As in the previous proof, we imagine a simulator that runs the protocol for any adversary A (the simulator must now also simulate the Corrupt oracles for A but this does not present any problems). When the adversary completes its execution and outputs a bit b , the simulator can tell whether the adversary succeeds by checking whether (1) a single Test query was made on instance i U ; (2) acc i U was TRUE at the time of the Test query; (3) instance i U is fresh (according to the definition of freshness appropriate for this setting; see Section 2.3); and (4) b = b. Success of the adversary is denoted by event fsSucc, and for any game P we let fsAdv A,P (k) def = 2 · Pr A,P [fsSucc] − 1. We refer to the real execution of the experiment as P 0 .
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, and sk j Server = ν 2 is exactly the probability that log g 1 μ 1 = x 2 + y 2 · log g 1 g 2 + z 2 · log g 1 h + w 2 · log g 1 (cd α ) (6) log g 1 μ 2 = x 1 + y 1 · log g 1 g 2 + z 1 · log g 1 h + w 1 · log g 1 (cd β )
log g 1 ν 1 = x 1 · r 2 + y 1 · r 2 log g 1 g 2 + z 1 · r 2 log g 1 h + w 1 · r 2 log g 1 (cd β )
+ x 2 · r 1 + y 2 · r 1 log g 1 g 2 + z 2 · r 1 log g 1 h + w 2 · r 1 log g 1 (cd α ) (8) log g 1 ν 2 = x 1 · r 2 + y 1 · r 2 log g 1 g 2 + z 1 · r 2 log g 1 h + w 1 · r 2 log g 1 (cd β )
+ x 2 · r 1 + y 2 · r 1 log g 1 g 2 + z 2 · r 1 log g 1 h + w 2 · r 1 log g 1 (cd α ). (9) It may be verified that Eqs. (6)- (9) are linearly independent and not identically zero, and so the values E, K , sk Before continuing, we introduce some new terminology. First, we say that instance i U is associated with U if either U = U or pid i U = U . More interestingly, we call a query Send 0 (C, * , * ) or Send 2 (C, * , * ) corrupted if the adversary had previously queried Corrupt 1 (C). Similarly, we call a query Send 1 (S, i, * ) (with pid i S = C) corrupted if the adversary had previously queried either Corrupt 1 (C) or Corrupt 2 (S, C, * ). We call a query Send 3 (S, i, * ) corrupted exactly when the corresponding query Send 1 (S, i, * ) (i.e., the Send 1 query for the same instance) is corrupted. Note that for any corrupted query Send * (U, i, * ) the adversary "knows" the password being used by i U at the time this query is made, and furthermore the instance i U is not fresh (as per the definition given in Section 2.3). The experiments we now introduce exactly parallel those introduced in the previous proof, with the main differences being that we only change the simulator's actions in response to noncorrupted Send queries.
Experiment P 3 . In experiment P 3 , the simulator runs the modified initialization procedure as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, with the values κ, χ 1 , χ 2 , ξ 1 , ξ 2 stored as before. In a way analogous to (but slightly different from) the previous proof, we define a msg 1 or msg 2 to be oracle-generated if it is output as a result of an Execute query or in response to a noncorrupted Send 0 or Send 1 query. Otherwise a message is called adversarially generated. We also define valid and invalid exactly as in the previous proof. We stress, however, that to determine whether a message msg 1 submitted to the Send 1 oracle is valid/invalid, the value of pw Server,Client at the time of the Send 1 query is used (even if this value is changed at some later point in the experiment via a Corrupt 2 query).
We now continue with our description of experiment P 3 . When the adversary makes a noncorrupted oracle query Send 2 ( Client, i, msg 2 ) and msg 2 is adversarially-generated and valid, the query is answered as in experiment P 2 but the simulator stores ∇ as the "session key" for this instance. In any other case (i.e., msg 2 is oracle-generated, or adversarially-generated but invalid), the query is exactly answered as in experiment P 2 .
When the adversary makes noncorrupted oracle query Send 3 ( Server, j, msg 3 ), the simulator examines msg 1 = first-msg-in for instance j Server . If msg 1 is adversarially generated and valid, the query is answered as in experiment P 2 but the simulator stores ∇ as the "session key" for this instance. In any other case (i.e., msg 1 is oracle-generated, or adversarially generated but invalid), the query is answered exactly as in experiment P 2 .
Finally, the definition of the adversary's success is changed. If the adversary queries Test(U, i) or Reveal(U, i) and sk i U = ∇, the simulator halts and the adversary succeeds. The adversary also succeeds if it queries Corrupt 1 (C) and there exists any instance associated with C which has session key ∇. Otherwise, the adversary succeeds as in experiment P 2 .
Since there are more ways for the adversary to succeed in P 3 and the experiment is otherwise identical to P 2 from the adversary's point of view, it follows immediately (as in Claim 3.5) that fsAdv A,P 2 (k) ≤ fsAdv A,P 3 (k).
Experiment P 4 . In experiment P 4 , we again modify the simulator's response to a noncorrupted Send 3 query made by the adversary. Upon receiving a noncorrupted query Send 3 ( Server, j, K |Sig ), the simulator examines msg 1 = first-msg-in for instance j Server . If msg 1 is oracle-generated and a value is to be assigned to sk (that a unique such pair exists follows from a similar argument as in the previous proof) and sets sk j Server = sk i Client . The modification described above is only made for noncorrupted Send 3 queries, and so in particular this means that the adversary did not make a query of the form Corrupt 2 ( Server, Client, * ) before initializing instance j Server (using a Send 1 query). It follows that instances Experiment P 5 . Here we again modify the simulator's response to a noncorrupted Send 3 query. Upon receiving noncorrupted query Send 3 ( Server, j, K |Sig ), the simulator examines msg 1 = first-msg-in for instance j Server . If msg 1 is adversarially-generated and invalid, the session key sk j Server is assigned a value randomly chosen from G. In all other cases, the query is answered as in experiment P 4 . Exactly as in Claim 3.6, it is the case that fsAdv A,P 5 (k) = fsAdv A,P 4 (k) (note in particular that the proof of Claim 3.6 holds even if the adversary learns the client's password at some later point).
Experiment P 6 . In experiment P 6 , we modify the simulator's response to noncorrupted Send 1 queries. Now, I is computed as I := h r g N +1 1
; again, note that g
is not a valid password. As in the proof of Claim 3.7, security of the (modified) Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme implies that |fsAdv A,P 5 (k) − fsAdv A,P 6 (k)| is negligible under the DDH assumption.
Experiment P 7 . We modify the simulator's response to noncorrupted Send 2 queries. In response to a noncorrupted query Send 2 ( Client, i, msg 2 ), the session key sk i Client is assigned a value chosen randomly from G if either: (1) msg 2 is adversarially-generated and invalid; or (2) msg 2 is oracle-generated (recall that a msg 2 output in response to a corrupted Send 1 oracle query is not considered oraclegenerated). In any other case, the session key is assigned a value as in experiment P 7 . As in the proof of Claim 3.8, we have fsAdv A,P 7 (k) = fsAdv A,P 6 (k).
Experiment P 8 . In experiment P 8 , we modify the simulators response to noncorrupted Send 0 queries. Now, C is computed as C := h r g N +1 1
. As in the proof of Claim 3.9, security of the (modified) Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme implies that |fsAdv A,P 8 (k) − fsAdv A,P 7 (k)| is negligible.
In experiment P 8 , the adversary can succeed in one of two ways: either it correctly guesses the value of the bit used by the Test oracle, or it succeeds as specified in experiment P 3 (namely, if it queries Test(U, i) or Reveal(U, i) with sk i U = ∇, or if it queries Corrupt 1 (C) and there exists any instance associated with C which has session key ∇). The probability that it succeeds in the second manner is at most Q(k)/N , where Q(k) is the number of on-line attacks made by A (cf. the definition of on-line attacks in Section 2.3). Otherwise, if the adversary queries Test(U, i) for a fresh instance for some negligible function ε(·). This concludes the proof of the theorem.
